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Federal Taxation
by Robert Beard*
In 2013, several interesting federal tax cases were decided in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and in the
United States Tax Court with decisions appealable to the Eleventh
Circuit.' These cases addressed the scope of the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.) § 83,2 the economic performance rules, and ownership of tax
refunds in bankruptcy.'

I. DAvis V. COMMISSIONER
In Davis v. Commissioner,' Allen Davis, the primary taxpayer in this
case, was the former CEO of an S corporation, CNG Financial Corporation (CNG), engaged in the payday lending business.' After resigning
as CEO, Davis continued to participate in the management of CNG as
a consultant. Due to his experience in the financial industry, CNG's
lenders expected Davis to continue to be employed with CNG, and the
termination of his employment with the company would have been an
event of default under some of CNG's credit agreements. In 2001,
Davis's wife, Judith, filed for divorce and requested that he transfer half
of his CNG shares to her as part of the property settlement. Davis
threatened to resign from his consultant role with the company if his
proportionate interest was reduced. Davis's resignation would have
created serious business difficulties for CNG.6

* Associate in the firm of King & Spalding, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University
(B.A., 2004); Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2007); University of Florida,
Frederic G. Levin College of Law (L.L.M., 2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of federal taxation cases decided during the prior survey period, see
Robert Beard, Federal Taxation, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 64 MERCER L. REV. 953 (2013).
2. I.R.C. § 83 (2012).
3. Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended.
4. 716 F.3d 560 (11th Cir. 2013).
5. See id. at 563; Davis v. Comm'r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 1927, 1928-29 (2011).
6. Davis, 716 F.3d at 563, 567.
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To resolve the impasse, the parties agreed that Davis would transfer
half of his shares to Judith but would receive an option to purchase the
same amount of shares from the company at an exercise price of $16
million, which appears to have been the fair market value (FMV) of the
shares at the time. Davis would agree to continue consulting for CNG.
Immediately afterwards, and as part of the same plan, CNG would
redeem the shares from Judith for a cash payment of $16 million.
Shortly before this plan was put into effect, Davis proposed a modification of the plan. Instead of receiving the option directly from CNG,
Davis proposed that he receive the option from Judith (the Judith
option) in connection with the transfer of shares to her in the divorce
settlement. As before, Davis would agree to continue to serve as a
consultant. When the transferred shares were redeemed by CNG, the
company would also assume her obligations under the option agreement
(the Allen option). Thus, Davis would end up with the same option from
CNG for the same number of shares at the same exercise price, but the
option would have come into being as part of the divorce settlement.
The modification was apparently intended to avoid any implication that
the option was compensatory.
The modified plan was put into effect. At the time of its assumption
by the company, the option was also modified to permit a cashless
exercise procedure, pursuant to which the FV of CNG shares would be
determined by a formula price, and Davis could elect to receive a
reduced number of shares in lieu of paying the option price. In 2004, the
year at issue, Davis exercised the CNG option using the cashless
exercise procedure and received shares worth approximately $37 million.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) asserted that the option exercise
constituted a taxable transfer of property for the performance of services
and that the $37 million value of the shares should be treated as
ordinary compensation income under § 83.8
Section 83(a) provides that a transfer of property in connection with
the performance of services gives rise to compensation income equal to
the excess of the FVIV of the property received over the amount, if any,
paid for the property, so long as the property is not subject to a
"substantial risk of forfeiture" (SRF).9 If the property is subject to an
SRF, when the SRF lapses, the recipient has compensation income that
is equal to the FMV of the property at the time the SRF lapses over the

7. See id. at 563-64.
8. Id. at 564. CNG claimed a compensation deduction on the issuance of the stock. To
ensure that the transaction was treated consistently, the IRS also issued a notice of
deficiency challenging the S corporation's compensation deduction. Id.
9. I.R.C. § 83(a).
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amount, if any, paid for the property."o Section 83(b) permits the
recipient to make an election (a § 83(b) election) to disregard any SRF
and include income at the time of transfer." Treasury Regulation
§ 1.83-712 provides a special rule for options (other than statutorily
defined incentive stock options) to acquire property that are granted to
an employee or independent contractor in connection with the performance of services.'"
In this case, the grant of the option is not treated as a transfer of
Therefore, there is no current compensation income. 5
property.'
Instead, if and when the option is exercised, the option recipient has
income equal to the excess of the FMV of the property received on
exercise over the price paid.16 A very narrow exception applies if the
option has a "readily ascertainable" FMV.' If the option has a readily
ascertainable FMV, the grant of the option is treated as a § 83 event,
and the subsequent exercise does not have any compensation implications."
The main issue in the Tax Court was whether the Allen option was
granted "in connection with" the performance of services as required by
§ 83." The court quickly concluded that the option was indeed issued
in connection with the performance of services.20 The court noted that,
under controlling precedent, property need not be transferred strictly as
compensation for § 83 to apply.2 ' Rather, there merely needs to be
some connection between the transfer and the past, present, or future
provision of services by the transferee." In this case, the court relied
on testimony from another family member involved in the business and
the fact that CNG's credit agreement required Davis to remain involved
in the business to conclude that CNG intended the option transfer to

10. Id.
11. I.R.C. § 83(b)(1).
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7 (2013).
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a).
14. See Davis, 716 F.3d at 566 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(aX2) (2013)).
15. See id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3 (2013)).
16. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 83(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3.
17. I.R.C. § 83(e)(4).
18. See id.
19. Davis, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1930. The court also considered the appropriate
valuation for the stock issued when the option was exercised. Id. at 1931. The court
concluded that the formula used in the cashless exercise procedure was the correct
standard for the stock's FMV. Id. at 1931-32.
20. Id. at 1932.
21. Id. at 1931.
22. See id.
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induce David to keep working with CNG.23 The court also noted that
the option agreement required Davis to notify CNG if he made a § 83(b)
election.'
The court read this provision to imply that the parties
intended the option agreement to be governed by § 83.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision on appeal."
The appellate court had no difficulty concluding that the record provided
ample support for the Tax Court's finding that the Allen option was
service related." The court also noted the significance of the provision
in the Allen option requiring notice to CNG if Davis made a § 83(b)
election.'
At the appellate level, the taxpayer made a new argument that the
Tax Court had not addressed.29 The taxpayer claimed that the transfer
of the Judith option was exempt from gain recognition under I.R.C.
§ 1041,o which is a non-recognition rule applicable to transfers
incident to divorce." The court rejected this argument, accepting that
the issuance of the Judith option as part of the property settlement was
subject to § 1041, but finding that the subsequent exercise of the Allen
option was not incident to the divorce.32 The court cited, PLR 201016031, an IRS private letter ruling" in which the IRS held that compensatory stock options issued by a third party and transferred in a
property settlement from the original recipient to an ex-spouse were
covered by § 1041 on the transfer, but that the transferee would have
ordinary income when the option was exercised.34 The court's citation
to this private letter ruling is somewhat puzzling. The fact that the
options in the ruling were issued prior to the divorce by a third party is
a significant distinguishing detail." Gain or loss can be recognized
when an option, which is property, is transferred from one holder to
another." On the other hand, issuance of an option is typically treated

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Davis, 716 F.3d at 563.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 567.
Id.
Id. at 569.
I.R.C. § 1041 (2012).
Davis, 716 F.3d at 569; see also I.R.C. § 1041(a).
Davis, 716 F.3d at 569-70.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 10-16-031 (Apr. 23, 2010).
Davis, 716 F.3d at 569; see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 10-16-031.
CompareDavis, 716 F.3d at 563, with I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 10-16-031.
See I.R.C. § 1234 (2012).
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as an open transaction, which does not give rise to gain or loss until the
option is exercised or lapses. 37
The court tried to square this circle by stating, in dicta, that Davis
would have had ordinary income at the time of exercise even if he had
retained the Judith option and exercised it later." This conclusion is
clearly correct given the Tax Court's factual findings, but its relevance
to the § 1041 issue is hard to understand. Consider the result if Judith
had transferred stock or other property to Davis instead of an option
(still in connection with services). Would the court conclude that § 1041
would prevent the recognition of compensation income on this transfer?
Likely not. Non-recognition provisions, § 1041 included, typically dictate
only that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized" on a specified transaction." They do not override other Code sections, like § 83, that do not
deal with gain or loss. 40
Assuming § 83 would apply to a transfer of non-option property
incident to divorce, there is no place left for § 1041 to have any
application in the option case. Income is deferred until the option is
exercised, but Treasury Regulation § 1.83-7 already mandates that
result.4 ' If the option timing rule did not apply, compensation income
would probably be recognized. Thus, the better conclusion is that § 1041
had no relevance in this case, as § 83 is simply beyond the scope of the
non-recognition provision.
Curiously, both opinions also cited a provision in the option agreement
that required Davis to give notice to CNG if he filed a § 83(b) election as
evidence that the parties intended the option to be granted in connection
with the performance of services.42 This inference is somewhat
surprising, because the facts in the Eleventh Circuit opinion indicate
that a § 83(b) election would not have been appropriate for the Allen
option.43 A taxpayer who makes a § 83(b) election disregards any SRF
in determining when income is taken into account under § 83.4
However, nothing in the facts indicates that the Allen option was subject
to an SRF." Moreover, even in the absence of an SRF, options are
subject to the special timing rule of Treasury Regulation § 1.83-7, which
provides that income is deferred until the option is exercised, unless the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Simnonds Precision Prods., Inc. v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 103, 117-18 (1980).
Davis, 716 F.3d at 570.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1041.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 83.
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a).
Davis, 716 F.3d at 565.
See id. at 564.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2 (2013).
See Davis, 716 F.3d at 564.
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option has a readily ascertainable FMV.46 The regulations set a very
high bar for readily ascertainable FMV, which only publicly traded
options (as opposed to options on stock that is publicly traded) can
usually meet. On the facts of this case, it is virtually certain that the
Allen option did not have a readily ascertainable FMV.4 As a result,
even if the Allen option were subject to an SRF, a § 83(b) election would
have had no effect, as the compensation event would be deferred until
the option was exercised under Treasury Regulation § 1.83-7.49
These facts suggest that the inclusion of the notice provision did not
reflect a concrete understanding of the parties that the issuance was
subject to § 83. More likely, the notice provision was deadwood
mistakenly carried over from another agreement, or perhaps a belt-andsuspenders provision intended to ensure that CNG was aware of Davis's
tax reporting position, even the implausible ones. While the notice
provision was certainly not decisive given the ample factual support for
application of § 83, the weight that both courts gave this factor
emphasizes the importance to drafters of avoiding sloppy language that
might be seized upon later by a hostile revenue agent.o
Another interesting element of the Davis case is that an alternative
structuring of the transaction likely would have produced the desired tax
results. The overall effect of the 2002 transactions was (1) Davis
exchanged 188.86 shares of CNG stock for an option to acquire the same
number of shares for $16 million, and (2) Judith received $16 million in
cash from CNG as a redemption payment." Almost the same results
could be achieved if CNG had lent Davis $16 million against 188.86
shares of CNG stock on a non-recourse basis and Davis had transferred
this cash to Judith in the property settlement. Economically, a nonrecourse loan secured by property is similar to an option to purchase
that property for the balance of the loan." This structure would also
defer any built-in gain in the CNG shares." This gain was presumably
recognized by Judith when CNG redeemed her stock.54 In addition, a
non-recourse loan would have given Davis a much stronger position
under § 83. While the § 83 regulations provide that a transfer of
property paid for with non-recourse financing may be equivalent to an
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a).
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b).
See Davis, 716 F.3d at 564.
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7.
See Davis, 716 F.3d at 565.
Id. at 564.
Cf In re Buchferer, 216 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997).
See Davis, 716 F.3d at 564; see also I.R.C. § 302 (2012).
See Davis, 716 F.3d at 564; see also I.R.C. § 302.
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option and may carry the same tax consequences," in this hypothetical
transaction, no property would be transferred to Davis. The property
encumbered by the non-recourse loan would be long-held stock of CNG.
Revenue Ruling 2007-49 (Situation 1),56 which ruled that previously
held stock of an employee that was made subject to a service-related
vesting restriction did not become § 83 property because there was no
transfer of the stock to the employee, supports this no-transfer position."
II.

SURIEL V. COMMISSIONER

Suriel v. Commissioner" involved the application of the economic
performance rules to payments to a settlement fund made on behalf of
another." Vibo, an S corporation, was a cigarette importer. Vibo
imported cigarettes produced by Protabaco, an unrelated foreign
manufacturer, and sold them in the United States.60
The backdrop to the Suriel case was the adoption and modification of
the Master Settlement Agreement (the MSA), which resolved lengthy
tobacco-liability litigation between forty-six states and major tobaccoproduct manufacturers (TPMs).6 1 For purposes of the MSA, a TPM was
either a manufacturer that produced cigarettes intended to be sold in
any MSA state or the first purchaser of cigarettes not originally intended
for sale in an MSA state who intended to sell the cigarettes in an MSA
state." Under this definition, Protabaco was a TPM, but Vibo was
not.6 3 The MSA offered TPMs two alternatives. First, manufacturers
could sign the MSA and become "participating manufacturers."'
Participating manufacturers would be required to make payments into
a settlement fund to resolve the states' negligence, antitrust, and other
claims." The parties stipulated that the MSA settlement fund as a
"Qualified Settlement Fund" (QSF) described the meaning of the
treasury regulation.6 6

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(aX2 ) (2013).
Rev. Rul. 07-49, 2007-2 C.B. 237.
Id.
141 T.C. No. 16 (2013).
See id. at 33-34.
Id. at 2-3, 5.
Id. at 3-6.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Suriel, 141 T.C. at 8; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1(a).
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TPMs that did not sign the MSA would be "nonparticipating manufacturers" (NPMs).6" In connection with the MSA, the states enacted
legislation requiring NPMs to make payments into escrow accounts that
would be used to satisfy any judgments the states obtained against
NPMs.6 ' An NPM could become a participating manufacturer at any
time by signing the MSA, but the manufacturer would be required to
make catch-up contributions to the settlement fund for the years when
it was an NPM." These catch-up payments were due over a twelveyear period, starting with the first year after the manufacturer signed
the MSA.o
For the first five years the MSA was in effect, the statutes enacted by
the states requiring escrow payments from NPMs contained a loophole
that, according to the Tax Court, "gave NPMs an unfair competitive
advantage over TPMs participating in the MSA."n During this period,
neither Protabaco nor Vibo was a participating manufacturer. Under
the MSA's definitions, Protabaco was an NPM. Vibo agreed contractually to make Protabaco's required escrow payments under the relevant
NPM statutes on Protabaco's behalf. At the end of 2003, the statutory
loophole was closed, and in 2004 Vibo signed the MSA. Since Vibo was
not technically a TPM, the MSA was amended to provide that Vibo
would be considered a TPM to allow it to become a participating
manufacturer. Vibo was also treated as a TPM with respect to cigarettes
it had sold previously; thus, it was obligated to make catch-up payments
for the period it was an NPM. None of the MSA documents imposed any
payment obligations on Protabaco.72
At the same time Vibo signed the MSA, Vibo and Protabaco entered
into an exclusive manufacturing and distribution agreement (the
Distribution Agreement) pursuant to which Vibo agreed to use Protabaco
as its exclusive manufacturer, and Protabaco agreed to use Vibo as its
exclusive importer. The Distribution Agreement recited that Vibo was
making "a considerable long term investment" by undertaking payment
obligations under the MSA.13
In 2004, the year it signed the MSA, Vibo deducted its entire catch-up
payment liability as part of its cost of goods sold, even though none of

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Suriel, 141 T.C. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
See id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10, 12-14, 27-28.
Id. at 5, 11.
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the catch-up payment was actually made in 2004. In fact, Vibo's
business went south, and it never made any catch-up payments. 4
The IRS challenged the claimed deduction." The ultimate issue was
when economic performance of the catch-up payments occurred. In
general, three requirements must be met for an accrual-method taxpayer
to deduct an expense. First, all events necessary to establish liability
Second, the amount of the
for the expense must have occurred.
liability must be determinable with reasonable certainty.7
Third,
The economic perforeconomic performance must have occurred.
mance rules are intended to prevent taxpayers from artificially
accelerating deductions by satisfying the first two mechanical tests.8 '
I.R.C. § 46182 and the regulations provide different economic performance triggers depending on the nature of the expense.' For example,
for deductions attributable to the use of property by the taxpayer (as in
the case of the lease), the economic performance occurs as the property
Thus, rental deductions, regardless of when they would
is used.'
otherwise accrue, can only be taken ratably over the term of the lease (if
not later).'
The parties in Suriel disagreed about the nature of the underlying
transaction and the economic performance rule that should be applied.
The taxpayer claimed that its obligation to the QSF should be viewed as
Protabaco's liability that it assumed as part of the consideration payable
for cigarettes under the Distribution Agreement." Under the economic
performance rule for property provided to the taxpayer, economic
performance occurs as property is provided." The government argued
that Vibo's obligations were its own liabilities and that the economic
performance rule for payments to QSFs should apply.'
This rule
provides that economic performance for such payments occurs only when

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. at 14.
See id. at 2.
Id. at 33.
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2XI) (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 461(h) (2012).
C.f Suriel, 141 T.C. at 33.
I.R.C. § 461 (2012).
See I.R.C. § 461; Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4 (2013).
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(3)(i).
See id.
See Suriel, 141 T.C. at 18.
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(2)(i).
See Suriel, 141 T.C. at 18.
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the payments are actually made" since no payments to the QSF were
ever made, no deductions would be allowed."o
The taxpayer attacked the IRS's characterization on two grounds.
First, the taxpayer argued that Protabaco, as the actual tobacco
manufacturer, was truly the TPM, and that Vibo's status as such under
the MSA was a "legal fiction" designed to facilitate its payments into the
settlement fund.91 Second, Vibo argued that it entered the MSA at the
behest of Protabaco and in effect assumed Protabaco's liability to make
QSF payments in connection with the Distribution Agreement."
The Tax Court invoked the Danielson rule, which generally provides
that taxpayers are bound to the form of their transactions." Both of
the taxpayer's arguments were defeated because the transaction
documents did not support them. For example, the Tax Court dismissed
the taxpayer's contention that Vibo's status as a TPM was a legal fiction
because nothing in the MSA documents supported it." To the contrary,
the documents specifically provided that Vibo was a TPM and that
Protabaco was not.95 Likewise, the Tax Court found no evidence that
Protabaco had any liability under the MSA for Vibo to assume.96 In
addition, no credible evidence was presented that Protabaco requested
or caused Vibo to join the MSA."
Given the importance of the transaction form in this decision, it is
interesting to consider whether a different structure could have produced
a different result. Specifically, consider the following alternative
arrangement. Instead of Vibo signing the MSA, Protabaco could have
become a signatory and could have become obligated to make current
and catch-up payments to the QSF.9" As part of the exclusive manufacturing and distribution agreement, Vibo could have agreed to make an
offsetting, periodic payment to Protabaco equal to its liability under the
MSA for that period. Under these facts, it would likely be difficult for
the IRS to argue that the QSF economic performance rules should

89. Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-3(c)(1) (2013).
90. See Suriel, 141 T.C. at 18; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-3(cXl).
91. Suriel, 141 T.C. at 22.
92. See id. at 27-28.
93. Id. at 16 (citing Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967)).
94. See id. at 22.
95. Id. at 6.
96. Id. at 27.
97. See id. at 26.
98. The Tax Court's opinion does not explain, nor does the Author know, whether there
were non-tax reasons why Protabaco was not the signatory to the MSA, as suggested here.
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apply.99 It would not follow, however, that Vibo would be able to
immediately deduct the amount of the liability. Treasury Regulation
§ 1.461-4(d)(6)(iv) 00 provides that, where a contract calls for property
or services to be provided to the taxpayer at multiple times, economic
performance occurs proportionately as the property or services are
provided."o'

The opinion suggests that the Distribution Agreement was open-ended
and did not call for a specific quantity of cigarettes to be delivered.102
The regulations do not clarify how the proportionate economic performance rule should be applied when the overall quantity of goods to be
provided is not fixed. One reasonable approach would be to estimate the
total amount delivered and deem economic performance to occur based
on the estimate. If this approach were adopted, Vibo would have been
able to deduct its catch-up payment liability over time as cigarettes were
delivered under the Distribution Agreement.os
III. ZUCKER V. FDIC
The decisions in Zucker v. FDIC (In re BankUnited Financial
Corp.)104 and FDIC v. Zucker (In re NetBank, Inc.).os addressed the

ownership of consolidated group tax refunds in bankruptcy.'
While
the details of these cases relate more to bankruptcy law and contract
interpretation and are thus beyond the scope of this Article, the subject
of these cases and their outcomes are significant for tax practitioners.
Both cases arose from bankruptcies of bank holding companies
(BHCs).' 7 A typical BHC consists of a parent corporation (the holding
company) that owns one or more banks or other financial entities.
Crucially, the bank subsidiary is the only entity that is an insured

99. The Tax Court suggested, but did not say, that this alternative structure might
have been successful:
While it may have been possible for Protabaco to settle with the settling States
and then pass on the MSA costs to Vibo in the form of increased prices, that did
not happen. [Suriell must be taxed in accordance with the transaction he and
Vibo consummated, not a transaction he might have consummated but did not.
Suriel, 141 T.C. at 26-27.
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(dX6Xiv) (2013).
101. Id.
102. See Suriel, 141 T.C. at 22.
103. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(6Xiv).
104. 727 F.3d 1100 (11th Cir. 2013).
105. 729 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2013).
106. See In re Netbank, Inc., 729 F.3d at 1345-46; In re BankUnited Fin. Corp., 727
F.3d at 1104.
107. See In re Netbank, Inc., 729 F.3d at 1346; In re Bank United Fin. Corp., 727 F.3d
at 1102.
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depositary institution. When a bank fails and goes into receivership, the
holding company will typically file for bankruptcy. The trustee of the
bankruptcy estate will marshal the assets of the holding company to pay
its creditors. The bank, on the other hand, will usually be taken into
receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The
FDIC will marshal the assets of the bank to minimize losses to the
deposit insurance fund. Thus, the bankruptcy trustee and the FDIC can
be adversaries competing for their share of the BHC's resources.
Though BHCs have more complicated internal dynamics than most
corporate families, for return-filing purposes, they are treated like any
other affiliated group of corporations. Specifically, the consolidated
return regulations permit the holding company to file a consolidated
return for the entire group, provided the subsidiaries initially consent to
be included in the return."' The tax liability for the whole group is
reported on a single return."o' The regulations treat the group's
aggregate tax liability as a joint and several liability of the entire
group.11o When a refund is due, federal tax law says little about who
owns the refund."
A bank that has reached the point of insolvency does so by losing
money. These losses are typically deductible for income tax purposes." 2 To the extent that these losses exceed income for a year, they
will give rise to a net operating loss (NOL)."' NOLs can generally be
carried back to the previous two taxable years, potentially giving rise to
refunds for taxes paid in those prior years."' Under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,"' NOLs for 2008 and 2009
could be carried back for up to five years, increasing their value even

more.116
These factors combine to create high-stakes controversies when BHCs
fail. The consolidated group will usually have large refunds from its
NOLs, and the controlling tax law says little about who owns these
refunds."'
Unlike in most non-financial bankruptcies, the holding
company and its bank subsidiaries will have sharply diverging interests.

108. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77 (2013).
109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-2 (2013).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-6 (2013).
111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77(a)(2Xv); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-7(c) (2013).
112. I.R.C. § 172(a) (2012).
113. I.R.C. § 172(c) (2012).
114. I.R.C. § 172(bX1XA) (2012).
115. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 26 & 42).
116. I.R.C. § 172(bX1XH)(i)(I) (2012).
117. See Tress. Reg. § 1.502-77(a)(2)(v); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-7(c).
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The resolution of these disputes in both NetBank and BankUnited
turned on the language of the taxpayers' tax-sharing agreements
(TSAs)."s
In both decisions, the holding company received a refund check from
the IRS that was attributable in large part to NOLs generated by the
bank. In both cases, the relevant TSAs clearly required the holding
company to pay the refund over to the bank. However, the parties
disagreed about the nature of this obligation. The holding companies
argued that it was a mere contractual debt."' In bankruptcy, such
debts can be written down. The FDIC alleged that the TSAs created an
agency relationship, whereby the holding companies received the refund
Under this
payments to be held in trust and delivered to the banks.'
view, the refund would not be property of the bankrupt holding company
and would have to be paid over in its entirety to the bank.12 '
The Eleventh Circuit scrutinized the relevant TSAs to determine
which view was correct.122 Applying ordinary contract law, the court
determined that, under the TSAs, the holding companies received the
refunds as agents for the banks. 23 Other courts faced with the same
issue have often reached the opposite conclusion.124 Because the
NetBank and Bank United opinions rely heavily on the specific language
of the TSAs at issue, it is hard to say whether these decisions reflect a
trend in Eleventh Circuit law or merely reflect the particular language
of these TSAs.

118. See In re Netbank, Inc., 729 F.3d at 1345-46; In re BankUnited Fin. Corp., 727
F.3d at 1103.
119. See BankUnited Fin. Corp. v.FDIC (In re BankUnited Fin. Corp.), 462 B.R. 885,
887-88, 896-97 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); Zucker v. FDIC(In re Netbank, Inc.), 459 B.R. 801,
805, 808-09 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010).
120. See In re BankUnitedFin. Corp., 462 B.R. at 896-97; In re Netbank, Inc., 459 B.R.
at 809.
121. See In re BankUnited Fin. Corp., 462 B.R. at 900.
122. See In re Netbank, Inc., 729 F.3d at 1347; In re Bank UnitedFin. Corp., 727 F.3d
at 1104-05.
123. In re NetBank, Inc., 729 F.3d at 1352; see In re BankUnitedFin. Corp., 727 F.3d
at 1108-09.
124. See, e.g., In re Team Fin., Inc., 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1493 (Bankr. D. Kan. Apr. 27,
2010); In re First Central Fin. Corp., 269 B.R. 502 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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